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Regulation by Blockchain: 
The Emerging Battle for Supremacy between the Code of Law and Code as Law 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Many advocates of distributed ledger technologies (including blockchain) claim that these 
technologies provide the foundations for an organisational form that will enable individuals to 
transact with each other free from the travails of conventional law, thus offering the promise of 
grassroots democratic governance without the need for third party intermediaries.  But does the 
assumption that blockchain systems will operate beyond the reach of conventional law withstand 
critical scrutiny?  This is the question which this paper investigates, by examining the intersection 
and interactions between conventional law promulgated and enforced by national legal systems (ie the 
‘code of law’) and the internal rules of blockchain systems which take the form of executable software 
code and cryptographic algorithms via a distributed computing network (‘code as law’).   It identifies 
three ways in which the code of law may interact with code as law, based primarily on the intended 
motives and purposes of those engaged in activities in developing, maintaining or undertaking 
transactions upon the network, referring to the use of blockchain: (a) with the express intention of 
evading the substantive limits of the law (‘hostile evasion’); (b) to complement and/or supplement 
conventional law with the aim of streamlining or enhancing compliance with agreed standards 
(‘efficient alignment’); and (c) to co-ordinate the actions of multiple participants via blockchain to avoid 
the procedural inefficiencies and complexities associated with the legal process, including the 
transaction, monitoring and agency costs associated with conventional law (‘alleviating transactional 
friction’).  These different classes of case are likely to generate different dynamic interactions between 
the blockchain code and conventional legal systems, which I describe respectively as ‘cat and mouse’, 
the ‘joys of (patriarchial) marriage’ and ‘uneasy coexistence and mutual suspicion’ respectively.  
 
I argue that the emerging response of conventional law in the first two kinds of case can be readily 
anticipated and understood.  While the first class of case threatens to undermine the rule of law and 
which national legal systems can be expected to take positive action to safeguard, the second class of 
case does precisely the opposite: reinforcing the primacy and sovereignty of national law, and hence 
blockchain applications falling within this class are likely to be regarded as a welcome development by 
conventional legal systems.  But it is the law’s response to the third category of applications 
(‘alleviating transactional friction') that is the most difficult to predict, due to the normative ambiguity 
of these applications.  Whether the conventional law ought to intervene to oversee these systems 
raises fundamental tensions between the sovereignty of law in modern legal systems, including the 
universal coverage of the rule of law and its guarantee of security (which includes, but extends 
beyond, providing transactional security), on the one hand, and respect for individual autonomy and 
freedom of association on the other.  I argue that, to the extent that the exercise of agency and 
freedom of association by a group of individuals results in adverse consequences for third parties and 
the broader public, state intervention via the code of law is normatively justified. Accordingly, the 
critical challenge is to identify the conditions and circumstances in which this threshold is reached in 
concrete contexts in order to justify the assertion of supremacy by conventional law over activities 
taking place on and arising out of blockchain systems. 
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Regulation by Blockchain: 
The Emerging Battle for Supremacy between the Code of Law and Code as Law 
 
Karen Yeung 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The current hype concerning distributed ledger technologies, commonly referred to as ‘blockchain’1, 
is rooted in their capacity to enable transactions between strangers through reliance on cryptographic 
software algorithms run across a distributed computing network, establishing secure peer-to-peer 
interactions through which an immutable2, tamper-proof shared ledger can be reconciled in real time. 
By obviating the need for trusted third-party intermediaries to guarantee the validity of transactions, 
which have, in contemporary society, taken the form of powerful institutions such as nation states or 
multi-national financial institutions, blockchain could radically alter the existing distribution of social 
and economic power3.  It is in the developing world, where reliable, trustworthy and effective legal 
institutions are often absent, that blockchain may deliver the most significant transformational 
change.  For example, the new Honduran government started creating a secure record of land title on 
the blockchain to address the inaccuracy and inadequacy of existing land and business records which 
corrupt public officials have tampered with to acquire title to property illegitimately.4 Yet those in 
advanced industrialised economies are also excited by blockchain’s potential, particularly in the 
financial services and commercial sector which could facilitate swift, secure and reliable transactions 
without the operational costs, delays and inefficiencies associated with conventional legal 
                                                        
  Interdisciplinary Professorial Fellow in Law, Ethics and Informatics, Law School & School of Computer 
Science, the University of Birmingham.  I am indebted to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments 
on an earlier draft.  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at UCL workshop, Blockchain and the 
Constitution of a New Financial Order Legal and Political Challenges, UCL Faculty of Laws, London 19 June 2017; 
Centre for Media & Communications Law/ Centre for Corporate and Securities Regulation & Transactional Law 
Research Group, Melbourne Law School, Melbourne, Australia, 13 April 2018 and ‘Law and Big Data’ Workshop, 
Bar-Illan University, Faculty of Law & Data Science Institute, Tel Aviv, Israel 14-15 May 2018.  
1  Although not all distributed ledgers technologies take the blockchain form, this article uses the term 
‘blockchain’ refers to distributed ledger technologies whether or not in the form of a blockchain.  See discussion 
at section 2.1 below. 
 
2  On blockchain immutability, see n.11 below. 
 
3   Many blockchain enthusiasts (sometimes known as ‘blockchainiacs’) believe that these technologies 
will fundamentally revolutionise economic and social organisation.  Eg Smith, Jamie (2016) ‘There Is More to 
Blockchain Than Moving Money. It Has the Potential to Transform Our Lives - Here's How’, World Economic 
Forum, 9 November 2016 available at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/there-is-more-to-blockchain-
than-moving-money/ (accessed 29 November 2017). The Economist (2017) ‘The Long Arm of the List’, 15 July, 
available at https://www.economist.com/news/world-if/21724906-trust-business-little-noticed-huge-startups-
deploying-blockchain-technology-threaten (accessed 4 December 2017); Boucher, Philip (2017). How Blockchain 
Technology Could Change Our Lives, European Parliamentary Research Service: European Parliament, February 
available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/581948/EPRS_IDA(2017)581948_EN.pdf (accessed 
29 November 2017). 
 
4  Schiller, Ben. "How the Technology Behind Bitcoin Is Going to Change the Lives of the Bottom Billion." 
Fast Company, 3 May 2016.  Sweden and Georgia are also experimenting with blockchain for Land Title Registry, 
although at the time of writing, the Honduran project appears to have stalled.  See Plaster, Morgan. "Can 
Blockchain Title Registry Make Property Rights More Secure?"  See 
https://www.globalrealestateexperts.com/2016/11/can-blockchain-title-registry-make-property-rights-more-sec 
(accessed 29 November 2017). 
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mechanisms.5  Yet, as a general purpose technology6, blockchain’s potential applications reach beyond 
the realm of commerce and finance.  For example, the UK’s Chief Scientific Officer refers to 
blockchain’s potential to help governments to collect taxes, deliver social security benefits, issue 
passports, record land registries, assure the supply chain of goods and ensure the integrity of 
government records7 in a more transparent and accountable form.8    By enabling new forms of social 
and community co-operation without a central authority, blockchain’s offers the promise of 
decentralising and democratising collective decision-making.    
 
But will blockchain technology operate without the need for the state as central authority, thus 
operating outside the realm of conventional law?   Although this question cannot be answered 
definitively given that blockchain applications are in their infancy, this paper offers a hypothesis 
concerning how these two quite different systems for governing interactions between strangers are 
likely to interact.   It seeks to identify and critically examine the underlying normative values and 
tensions that conventional law-makers and enforcement officials must confront in determining 
whether legal intervention into blockchain systems is necessary and justified.  My analysis begins 
from the premise popularised by cyber-scholar Lawrence Lessig who claimed that, within cyberspace, 
‘code is law,’ in that the internet’s technical infrastructure and software code regulates, constrains and 
enables on-line behaviour and interaction9.  By examining the extent to which, ‘governance by 
blockchain’ may avoid the reach of conventional law, this paper interrogates the intersection and 
interactions between two quite different modalities of governance: conventional law (the ‘code of law’), 
on the one hand, and the internal rules of blockchain systems which take the form of executable 
software code and technical protocols (‘code as law’)10, on the other.  It offers a schematic map of the 
different kinds of interaction that are emerging, and likely to emerge, between these two forms of 
social ordering as the technology develops and matures.    
 
I will argue that the belief that blockchain systems will operate outside of, and independently from, 
conventional law, rests on two assumptions: firstly, that the conventional state legal system is 
rendered redundant because blockchain provides guarantees of security of equal (or greater) 
effectiveness and efficiency compared to those currently provided by conventional law, and secondly, 
that the state will refrain from intervening in blockchain networks - either because its interests are 
not threatened by particular blockchain networks or applications, or, even if they are, the state 
nevertheless lacks the practical capacity to take effective action to forestall or mitigate these threats.    
My argument is that these assumptions are highly implausible: not only are legitimate state interests 
threatened by blockchain systems consisting of threats to the universality of the rule of law, but also 
because the security offered by blockchain systems is narrow and limited to ‘transactional security’.  
Even if blockchain systems can successfully provide reliable and efficient transactional security, they 
are unlikely to deliver other critical security guarantees (including protection against interference 
with rights of property, threats to health and safety, and unfair exploitation), that are currently (albeit 
imperfectly) provided by conventional law.   
                                                        
 
5  Yeung, Karen (2017) ‘Blockchain, Transactional Security and the Promise of Automated Law 
Enforcement: The Withering of Freedom under Law?’ In Philipp Otto and Eike Graf (eds) 3TH1CS – A Reinvention 
of Ethics in a Digital Age, 132-46.  Berlin: iRights.Media. 
 
6  Government Office for Science (2016). Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Block Chain. London 
(hereafter the ‘Blackett Review 2016’). 
 
7  Blackett Review 2016, 6. 
 
8  Blackett Review 2016, 30. 
 
9  Lessig, L. (1999). Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York, Basic Books. 
 
10  In this paper, I adopt the approach taken by the Blackett Review, referring to the technical code of 
distributed ledger systems as including both the software (computer code) and protocols, since both are 
required for distributed ledgers to function: Blackett Review 41. 
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The remainder of this paper proceeds in four parts.   First, I explain the basic technological 
mechanisms through which blockchain operates, noting how their decentralised nature is likely to 
create difficulties for conventional law-makers and enforcement officials in responding appropriately 
and effectively.  Secondly, I identify three different ways in which the code of law may interact with 
code as law, based primarily on the intended motives and purposes of network participants when 
engaging in transactions within the network vis a vis the conventional law, and secondly on the 
nature, scope and magnitude of potential harms arising from particular blockchain applications.  
These purposes that I identify as likely to motivate participants to utilise blockchain systems are 
concerned to (a) deliberately evade the substantive constraints of conventional law (‘hostile evasion’) 
(b) complement and/or supplement conventional law to streamline or enhance compliance with legal 
standards (‘efficient alignment’), and (c) to co-ordinate actions across and between multiple 
participants, without the procedural inefficiencies associated with the conventional legal process 
(‘alleviating transactional friction’).   Each of these three motivations can be expected to generate a 
particular kind of dynamic interaction between law and blockchain systems, which I describe as cat 
and mouse, the joys of marriage and uneasy coexistence and mutual suspicion respectively.  The penultimate 
section of the paper reflects upon the deeper normative challenges and tensions underlying these 
predicted interactions between the two ordering systems, which are most acute in the third class of 
case aimed at alleviating transactional friction, and is ultimately rooted in the shifting and uncertain 
boundaries between the public and private realm in a continuously networked digital age.  The final 
section concludes. 
 
2. How will the code of law interact with code as law? 
 
Before proceeding, a brief explanation of what blockchain is, how blockchain works, and why it 
apparently render third party intermediaries redundant, is required, and to which I first turn. 
 
2.1 Distributed ledger technologies (‘blockchain technology’): a brief outline 
 
Blockchain is an append-only, distributed database that is collaboratively stored, maintained and 
updated across a network of computers, with each computing ‘node’ in the network storing an 
identical copy of the database11. Cryptographic methods enable mathematical consensus to confirm the 
consistency of each transaction’s digital record, which is then permanently recorded on the database, 
preventing their alteration or deletion.12   Information on the blockchain is represented as 
cryptographic tokens which guarantee the technical authenticity of the information.  Blockchain 
systems record the allocation of these tokens among anonymous accounts, automatically recording all 
exchanges of these tokens between accounts and automatically updating each copy of the database at 
each node.  The security and accuracy of the ledger is maintained through the use of computational 
techniques in which cryptographic ‘keys’ and signatures control who can do what with the shared 
ledger.13 If conflict between the different copies of the database arises (for example, because someone 
is trying to tamper with the data) an automatic cryptographic consensus mechanism14 is designed to 
                                                        
11  Blackett Review 2016. 
 
12  This so-called ‘immutability’ is, however, imperfect due to the possibility of ‘forking’ software code, 
which refers to the copying of an existing open source software programme and the distribution of a modified 
version of it.  If both the old and new versions of the software are implemented, this can result in competing 
versions of public blockchains with the result that two distinct ledgers are maintained. See Walch, Angela (2017) 
"Open Source Operational Risk: Should Public Blockchains Serve as Financial Market Infrastructures?" In David 
Lee Kuo Chuen and Robert H Deng (eds.), Handbook of Digital Banking & Internet Finance, Volume 2, 
forthcoming.  Werbach points out that immutability is not always beneficial for trust, because it can provide 
false confidence. In particular, the blockchain guarantees that a transaction was recorded accurately and once 
only: it does not guarantee that the person making the transaction was the rightful owner of the private key, or 
other factors: Kevin Werbach (2016) ‘Trustless Trust.’ SSRN Network, accessed 9 June 2018. 
 
13  Blackett Review 2016,  5. 
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ensure that only those updates get permanently recorded on the blockchain that are consistent with 
the earlier, stored versions of the database.  Distributed ledger systems which take the blockchain 
form aggregate transactions into ‘blocks’, and these are added to a ‘chain’ of existing blocks using a 
cryptographic signature (hence the name ‘blockchain’)15.  In public (or ‘unpermissioned’) blockchain 
systems16, these records are fully transparent and can therefore be viewed by anyone on the network, 
thus creating a ‘distributed, shared, encrypted-database that serves as an irreversible and incorruptible 
public repository of information.’17   
 
The revolutionary potential of blockchain technologies may not be readily apparent from this 
thumbnail sketch of their mechanics, which lies in its capacity to provide a ‘distributed yet provably 
accurate record’18 without a central intermediary to ensure the veracity and accuracy of transactions 
and their recording on the database19.  Blockchain has therefore been described as signifying a move 
to ‘trustless trust’20 in which transactional security is achieved via reliance on ‘trust-by-computation’ 
established across a decentralised computing network.  Accordingly, The Economist has described 
blockchain as a ‘trust machine’21, with Antonopolous similarly claiming that blockchain represents a 
‘shift from trusting people to trusting math.’22  Blockchain could therefore transform the internet from 
a powerful mechanism for transferring information, into an even more powerful vehicle for 
transferring value23: because all participants trust in the veracity and accuracy of a singular trusted 
state of truth without the need for trusted actors24, value can be securely transferred via the 
blockchain.  While Bitcoin was the first public blockchain, creating the first electronic payment 
                                                        
14  In the Bitcoin blockchain, the consensus mechanism is referred to as ‘mining’.  Bitcoin: The Magic of 
Mining (2015), The Economist, 10 January at 58 available at http://www.economist.com/node/2163812 
(accessed 9 June 2018). 
 
15  Blackett Review 2016, 5. 
 
16  Blockchains can be public (‘permissionless’ or ‘unpermissioned) or private (‘permissioned’). An 
unpermissioned ledger, such as the Bitcoin blockchain, has no single owner and allows anyone to contribute to 
the data, making the ledger censorship resistant and difficult to hack: because a successful cyber-attack would 
require all existing copies of the ledger to be simultaneously attacked, and attempts to tamper with the ledger 
would be thwarted by the automatic consensus mechanism.  In contrast, permissioned ledgers are closed 
systems which have one or multiple owners.  When new records are added, the ledger’s integrity is checked 
through a limited consensus process carried out by trusted actors who have controlling authority over the 
ledger: Blackett Review 2016, 17. 
 
17  Wright, A., and De Fillipi, P. (2015) Decentralised Blockchain Technology and the rise of Lex 
Cryptographia’ SSRN network, 2. 
 
18  Werbach. Supra n.11. 
 
19  Blackett Review 2016. 
 
20  Werbach. Supra n 11. 
 
21  The Economist. (2015). ‘The Trust Machine - The Promise of Blockchain.’ 31 October. 
 
22  Antonopoulos, A. (2014). Bitcoin security model: trust by computation. O’Reilly Radar. 20 February, 
available at http://radar.oreilly.com/2014/02/bitcoin-security-model-trust-by-computation.html (accessed 10 
June 2018). 
 
23   Yaw-Owusu, F. ‘Blockchain: Moving from the Internet of Information to the Internet of Value’ at 
https://themarketmogul.com/blockchain-information-internet-value/ (accessed 21 May 2018) 
 
24  Finck, M. (2017). ‘Blockchain Regulation’ Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research 
Paper Series No. 17-13, Available via SSRN Network, 4. 
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system in 2009 based on a decentralised peer-to-peer network, its underlying blockchain technology is 
general purpose in nature.  Blockchain could therefore be employed in many different contexts in 
which a ledger is required, such as electronic record-keeping and registries, supply chain verification 
and persistent attribution for digital works.25 Accordingly, blockchain could radically disrupt existing 
political and economic orders by dispensing with the need for conventional third party intermediaries, 
including the state, enabling peer-to-peer transactions via the blockchain without the operational 
inefficiencies currently associated with conventional law.26 
 
Before embarking on an investigation of the interaction between blockchain systems and conventional 
law, two features of public blockchains arising from their decentralised form may be especially 
challenging for conventional law are worth highlighting: first, identifying which (if any) actors’ 
motives, intentions, rights, interests and obligations should be ascribed legal significance, and 
secondly, identifying practical strategies for intervening in the operation of blockchain network, to 
which I first turn. 
 
2.2 Multiple participants, interests and purposes within a decentralised system 
 
The decentralised, distributed nature of public blockchains means there is no single, centrally 
controlled and integrated entity which conventional legal systems can regard as a bearer of legal 
rights and/or duties.  This might generate difficulties for conventional law-makers and enforcement 
officials when considering blockchain’s legal implications, and may require the identification of the 
interests, purposes and/or intentions of particular blockchain networks, applications and/or those 
who participate in and upon them, which are likely to be multiple and divergent.  Although the 
activities of corporate entities implicate many stakeholders, with many varied interests, purposes and 
intentions, a corporate entity has long been recognised as a single legal entity with juristic 
personality.  Because corporate entities are ‘artificial’ persons, their governance structure is mandated 
by law, requiring both an underlying constitutional framework (known as a company’s Memorandum 
and Articles of Association) which specifies how the company can act: typically through its directors 
acting in accordance with a specified procedure.  Moreover, conventional legal systems have, over 
time, developed settled principles and doctrines through which the intention and motives of particular 
individuals within the corporate entity might be legally attributed to it for particular legal purposes 
(including the application of criminal punishment, which typically requires proof of criminal intent).27  
Public blockchain networks may be analogous to corporate entities in that a variety of actors are 
directly involved in their operation, who are widely dispersed in space and time, with very distinct 
interests, opportunities, forms of participation and motives for their involvement.28  These include the 
individual entrepreneurs who initiate and develop ideas for new blockchain applications; the software 
developers who devise, implement and contribute to the open source software code and cryptographic 
protocols upon which public blockchains generally operate (including the ‘core developers’ who 
occupy informal leadership roles based on their reputation and performance within the open source 
software developer community29);  the operators of nodes (i.e. those providing the computing power, 
performing the cryptographic proofs and storing a copy of the ledger); the holders of private keys  (i.e.  
                                                        
25  Blackett Review 2016; Werbach. Supra n.11. 
 
26  Atzori, M. (2015). ‘Blockchain Technology and Decentralized Governance: Is the State Still Necessary?’ 
SSRN network (accessed 10 June 2018). 
 
27  Coffee, J. (1981). ‘No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An Unscandalised Essay on the Problem of 
Corporate Punishment.’ Michigan Law Review 79: 413-424. Ferran, E. (2011). ‘Corporate Attribution and the 
Directing Mind and Will.’ Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 127: 239-259.  
 
28  It is these differential interests that are highlighted in debates about blockchain governance: see for 
example De Filippi, P. and B. Loveluck (2016). ‘The invisible politics of Bitcoin: governance crisis of a 
decentralised infrastructure.’ Internet Policy Review 5(3) doi: 10.14763/2016.3.427.  
 
29  Walch, A. (2017). ‘Open Source Operational Risk: Should Public Blockchains Serve as Financial Market 
Infrastructures?’  D. L. K. Chuen and R. H. Deng (eds.) Handbook of Digital Banking & Internet Finance, Volume 
2.: forthcoming, 10.  
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those who transact upon the network by, for example, trading in cryptocurrency) and commercial 
providers of ‘wallet’ services that provide a user-friendly interface for those wishing to transact on the 
blockchain network but lack the technical sophistication, capacity or confidence to do so directly30.   
Yet, unlike corporate stakeholders, participants in blockchain networks are not recognised by law as 
bound together in a single, centralised organisational form.  For the time being, conventional law does 
not mandate the governance structure of blockchain systems, perhaps partly because blockchain 
governance structures are encoded in their software architecture, rather than being purely socially 
constructed, unlike the corporate entity.    Accordingly, the response of conventional legal systems to 
questions concerning the relevance and attribution of the intentions of particular individuals involved 
in blockchain networks is likely to remain uncertain until the technology matures and direct 
encounters between them occur more frequently.  Yet it is reasonable to expect that their response 
will depend on the particular context and question arising for consideration, including whether the 
operation of particular blockchain activities threatens legitimate state interests, discussed more fully 
at section 4 below31.  I expect that legislators and enforcement officials will take a highly pragmatic 
stance, similar to their approach in exerting national legal authority over conduct occurring on 
internet: if law-makers and enforcement officials regard the operation of blockchain networks as 
significantly threatening legitimate state interests, then they are likely to attempt intervention 
against any actors that they identify as in a position to exert influence over the network and/or 
activities taking place upon it (whether or not it is morally appropriate to hold them responsible) in 
order to safeguard national interests. 
 
A different but related practical challenge arises when conventional law-enforcement officials seek to 
intervene in the operation of public blockchain networks.   One significant advantage of decentralised 
computer systems is the absence of any ‘single point of failure’.  Although this enhances the resilience 
of the network’s stability and operation32, it may be less desirable from a conventional law perspective 
because there is no single organisational or individual gatekeeper upon that it targeted in order to 
intervene in their operation.33   These concern about the regulability of blockchain resonates with 
academic debates concerning the regulability of the internet taking place when the internet first 
emerged.  Cyber-libertarians claimed that the internet’s distributed, global nature rendered it 
essentially ungovernable by nation states and beyond the effective reach of law, owing to the 
possibility for anonymous participation and the high degree of mobility of participants in cyberspace, 
enabling them to relocate freely to other areas of cyberspace.34  Cyber-paternalists disagreed, arguing 
that there was nothing inherent in the nature of cyberspace that rendered it beyond the reach of law, 
                                                        
 
30  In relation to the bitcoin blockchain, for example, individuals who wanted to own or transact in Bitcoin 
at the time of its inception in 2009 could either run the Bitcoin protocol (a Bitcoin client) on their own computer, 
or create an account on a website that runs the bitcoin client for its users.  But because bitcoin has been 
designed to preserve the scarcity of bitcoins, the difficulty of running the cryptographic proof (called Bitcoin 
‘mining’) increases as the number of coins increases, so it is no longer practically possible for individuals to mine 
new coins and who instead must buy bitcoins with fiat currencies through cryptocurrency exchanges, ie. firms 
that hold bitcoins and are willing to sell them at a specified exchange rate: Guadamuz, A. and C. Marsden (2015). 
‘Blockchains and Bitcoin: Regulatory Responses to Cryptocurrencies’. First Monday 20 (12). 
 
31  See below discussion of the rule of law (at section 2.1) and, for example, the potential harm to human 
health and safety in relation to energy distribution via blockchain systems (at section 2.3), to the property 
interests of participants (at section 3.2) and to creditors of an insolvent company (at section 3.2). 
 
32  For a cyber-attack to succeed, it would have to attack all the copies simultaneously. 
 
33  The decentralised nature of the network also makes the legitimate and effective governance of 
blockchain networks particularly challenging, in contrast to vertically integrated bureaucratic forms of 
organisation: see De Filippi, P. and B. Loveluck (2016). ‘The invisible politics of Bitcoin: governance crisis of a 
decentralised infrastructure.’ Internet Policy Review 5(3). 
  
34  DeNardis, L. (2014). The Global War for Internet Governance. New Haven, Yale University Press. 
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with Lessig arguing, for example, that ordinary laws that apply to behaviour in the physical world 
regulate behaviour in cyberspace, although the latter’s effectiveness might vary depending upon the 
characteristics of cyberspace, and which states might also regulate through control of the code itself, 
or the institutions (i.e. the coders) who produce the code that shapes the contours of cyberspace.35   As 
time passed and the internet matured, it soon became apparent that the predictions of the cyber-
paternalists were closer to the mark.36  It remains to be seen whether the same or similar dynamic will 
play out in the interactions between blockchain and conventional legal systems, to which I now turn. 
 
2.3 Anticipated Forms of Interaction between the Code of Law and Code as Law 
 
In this section, I develop a typology of emerging and anticipated interactions between blockchain and 
conventional legal systems.  It springs from my view that the nature of these interactions will depend 
critically upon whether particular blockchain applications are likely to be regarded by the state as 
threatening its legitimate interests.  I identify two core interests which conventional legal systems 
have a legitimate responsibility to protect and safeguard that particular blockchain applications might 
threaten: first, the rule of law and the universality of its application, and secondly, the safety and 
security of its citizens.  Furthermore, I will suggest that the extent to which these interests are 
potentially threatened by blockchain is likely to depend upon at least two sets of variables: (a) first, 
and most importantly, the purposes and intentions of blockchain network participants concerning 
conventional law in seeking to engage in blockchain network activities, and (b) secondly, the nature, 
scope and magnitude of potential harm (both to network participants and to third parties) arising 
from particular blockchain applications.  On this basis, I identify three different classes of blockchain 
applications, based primarily on the first of these variables, which I refer to as (a) hostile evasion, where 
blockchain systems are used deliberately to evade the substantive constraints of conventional law (b) 
efficient alignment, where blockchains are employed to complement and/or supplement conventional 
law to streamline or enhance compliance with legal standards, and (c) alleviating transactional friction, 
referring to blockchain applications aimed at co-ordinating actions between multiple participants, 
motivated by a desire to avoid the procedural inefficiencies, costs and complexities associated with the 
conventional legal process.   Each of these three motivations can be expected to generate a particular 
kind of dynamic interaction between blockchain and conventional legal systems, which I describe as of 
cat and mouse, the joys of marriage and uneasy coexistence and mutual suspicion respectively. 
 
2.3.1 Hostile evasion provoking on-going ‘cat and mouse’ interaction 
 
(a) Using blockchain to evade substantive legal duties and obligations 
 
We have seen how blockchain systems enable direct peer-to-peer social cooperation between 
strangers without the need for the state or other third-party intermediary to guarantee the security of 
transactions.   Yet blockchain is employed deliberately to evade the substantive obligations imposed by 
conventional law, this directly threatens the rule and sovereignty of law upon which conventional 
legal systems are rooted.  National law enforcement officials can therefore be expected to assert their 
legal authority to halt and deter such activities,37  for if they fail to act against blatant attempts to 
evade the law, this exposes potential victims of crime to serious harm and, as the European Banking 
Authority has warned, could undermine the reputation of the regulator and confidence in the integrity 
                                                        
35  Wu, T. and J. Goldsmith (2008). Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World. New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
36  Ibid.  DeNardis, supra n 33. 
 
37  Ripple Inc’s failure to comply with anti-money laundering requirements may or may not have been 
intentional, although the Statement of Facts and Violation issued by FinCEN at the time at which the settlement 
was announced identifies at least one instance in which a Ripple employee intentionally refrained from insisting 
upon completion of ‘Know Your Customer’ requirements in the face of a client’s threat to use a competitor 
which did not ‘require nearly as much paperwork’: FinCEN Statement of Facts and Violations, per FinCen Press 
Release, ibid. 
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of the national legal system itself.38  Accordingly, if blockchain networks, particularly those dealing in 
cryptocurrencies, are used intentionally to evade the substantive obligations imposed by tax legislation, 
financial market regulation, mandatory consumer protection legislation and the like, then, particularly 
if the magnitude of potential harm to individuals and society is considered significant, national legal 
systems are likely to take enforcement action against them.  
 
One of the challenges that conventional legal systems have already confronted, however, is navigating 
the multiplicity of participants and their varied motivations for engaging with blockchain networks.  
Given the many benefits of blockchain systems, it is reasonable to expect states to allow their use for 
legitimate purposes, whilst clamping down on blockchain activities aimed at avoiding their 
substantive laws.  For example, the concept Bitcoin was originally formulated by anonymous founder, 
Satoshi Nakamoto, as an alternative to conventional fiat currencies issued by nation states that could 
operate as a form of payment.39  In and of itself, the establishment of an alternative payment system 
does not threaten the rule of law any more than a barter system for the exchange of second-hand 
goods by residents within local communities threatens the rule of law.  However, the greater degree of 
anonymity (in contrast to conventional currencies) associated with the use of Bitcoin as a form of 
payment meant that it became a popular vehicle for those wishing to engage in illegal activities.   
 
Accordingly, in circumstances where cryptocurrencies have been used deliberately to circumvent 
substantive legal requirements, national legal authorities have selectively sought to exert their 
sovereign authority over those activities (and, where possible, the participants who engage in them) 
on a piecemeal basis.  Yet the distributed nature of the Bitcoin network and the absence of a single 
legal entity has meant that in clamping down on illegal activity, conventional legal authorities have 
targeted their enforcement activity at particular public interfaces within the broader digital ecosystem 
in which cryptocurrencies have been used for illegal purposes, rather than directly intervening the 
Bitcoin network per se.  For example, US Federal Regulators moved swiftly to shut down online 
marketplace ‘Silk Road’, in which Bitcoin rose to prominence by creating a platform over which a 
range of illegal merchandise could be purchased and then paid for using Bitcoin, rather than 
attempting to directly restrict the use of Bitcoin40.  Nor have national authorities focused solely on 
seeking to identify and take enforcement action against the individuals using cryptocurrencies 
intentionally to evade the substantive obligations arising under conventional law.  Rather, they appear 
to have been more concerned with closing off opportunities to use cryptocurrencies to evade legal 
duties, pursuing a preventative and defensive strategy, rather than one focused on apprehending and 
punishing the primary offenders.  National regulators have therefore largely avoided taking across-
the-board regulatory action against Bitcoin, with Thailand being the only nation that has sought to 
prohibit its use in 2013 (rather unsuccessfully) while China has restricted lawful dealing in Bitcoin to 
commodity trading, effectively prohibiting it from being used as a form of currency41.   
 
Financial regulations have also sought to intervene in the cryptocurrency eco-system where 
participants have created opportunities for criminal and other attempts at evading the law.  For 
example, the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued guidelines in 2013 
indicating that decentralized currencies should comply with money laundering regulations, bringing a 
successful enforcement action against Ripple Labs Inc, which operated a virtual currency exchange in 
2015.  This action resulted in a civil penalty settlement of US$ 700,000 for alleged wilful violation of 
the anti-money laundering laws, while Ripple also settled a criminal investigation by the US 
Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California for the same anti-money laundering failures, 
agreeing to pay a criminal fine of US$450,000 in partial satisfaction of FinCEN's $700,000 
                                                        
38  European Banking Authority (EBA) (2014). EBA Opinion on ‘Virtual Currencies, EBA EBA/Op/2014/08 at 
36 available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-
08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf (accessed 4 December 2017). 
 
39  Guadamuz, and Marsden, supra n 29.  
 
40  Ibid. 
 
41  Ibid. 
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penalty.42   FinCEN’s enforcement action demonstrates why conventional law-makers and 
enforcement officials can be expected to assert their sovereign authority over the ecosystem in which 
blockchain-based activities are embedded in circumstances where those activities are aimed at 
avoiding the reach of national law: in this case, Ripple’s allegedly wilful failure to comply with money 
laundering regulations was regarded by FinCEN as facilitating organised crime, so that failure to act 
against Ripple might be interpreted as a failure to uphold the rule of law and secure its universal 
application.   
 
b)  A ‘cat and mouse’ battle for supremacy  
 
Guadamuz & Marsden suggest that that the lack of any significant regulatory push towards outright 
outlawing of Bitcoin (or other cryptocurrencies) arises because governments do not presently feel 
threatened enough to ban its use and, more importantly, because action could prove futile given its 
decentralised nature43.  Because blockchain is decentralised and distributed in structure, creating an 
identical ledger shared across a widely dispersed network of nodes located around the globe, many 
believe that public blockchains are effectively beyond the reach of sovereign state control44.  But 
although the absence of a central controller inevitably makes it considerably more difficult to exert 
practical control over blockchain networks, these networks operate within a wider ecosystem of 
applications, exchanges and practices in which the network interfaces with the real world45 and it is 
these key intermediaries that have been, and are likely to continue to be, the targets of regulatory 
intervention.  Thus, FinCEN’s administrative guidance and subsequent enforcement action was 
targeted at cryptocurrency exchanges, rather than addressed and aimed at miners who run the 
underlying cryptographic protocols, or at Bitcoin users.46    
 
This strategy of targeting intermediaries may be effective in the short-term, although it would not, 
for example, reach through to blockchain activities that do not involve an exchange of currency via an 
intermediary, such as the spending of cryptocurrency directly on goods and services.  But national 
legal systems could, if they desired, introduce legally enforceable restrictions on the acceptance 
cryptocurrencies as a form of payment by suppliers of goods and services. The resulting interaction 
between the code of law and code as law can thus be described as ‘cat and mouse’: as blockchain 
activities and their ecosystems evolve, conventional legal systems will need to monitor developments, 
continually reassessing whether additional or alternative strategies to combat blockchain activities 
                                                        
42  Financial Crimes and Enforcement Network (‘FinCEN’) (2015) ‘FinCEN Fines Ripple Labs Inc in First Civil 
Enforcement Action Against a Virtual Currency Exchanger’, Press Release issued 5 May, available at 
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-fines-ripple-labs-inc-first-civil-enforcement-action-against-
virtual (accessed 29 November 2017). 
 
43  Guadamuz and Marsden, supra n 20 at n 134.  
 
44  cf Blackett Review 2016, Chapter 3, supra n 6. 
 
45  Golumbia highlights the embeddedness of cryptocurrencies within existing economic and financial 
systems to argue that the cyber-libertarian visions will not be realized in practice.  For him, ‘…Bitcoin fails to 
embody any substantial alternative to [our existing financial systems].  The reasons for this have little to do with 
technology and everything to do with the financial systems in which Bitcoin and all other cryptocurrencies are 
embedded, systems that instantiate the forms of power that cannot be eliminated through either wishful 
thinking or technical or even political evasion: the rich and powerful will not become poor and powerless simply 
because some people decide to operate alternative exchange economies.  Lacking a robust account of 
transforming these systems of power, even without Bitcoin’s flaws, a ‘perfect’ cryptocurrency would exacerbate, 
rather than address, the existing serious problems with our monetary and financial systems.’ Golumbia, David 
(2015) ‘Bitcoin as Politics: Distributed Right-Wing Extremism’ In Geert Lovink, Jess van Zyl and Patricia de Vries 
(eds/) Moneylab Reader: An Intervention in Digital Economy, 118-31. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, 
2015, 120. 
 
46  Paech, Philipp (2017) ‘The Governance of Blockchain Financial Networks’ Modern Law Review 80: 1073-
110. 
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aimed at wilfully evading legal and regulatory obligations are needed in order to protect the public 
interest and safeguard the rule of law.47   In this respect, the Blackett Review was rather sanguine, 
stating that ‘(c)ontrary to public perception, the underlying architecture (of unpermissioned 
blockchains) makes it relatively easy to track transactions and establish the identity of people who 
misuse the system.  Regulators have learned how to control the ‘on-ramps and ‘off-ramps’ where value 
flows in and out of the system.’48  
 
However, as blockchain is more widely taken up in which, for example, financial assets are moved onto 
blockchain networks, the role of intermediaries is likely to decrease.  If so, then national authorities 
may need to identify alternative addressees upon whom regulatory obligations can be effectively 
imposed49.  But serious doubts arise concerning whether national legal systems will develop 
practically viable strategies to cracking down on illicit blockchain activities in the absence of 
intermediaries who can constitute legitimate targets for regulatory intervention.50   This may, 
however, not turn out to be a significant problem if, as Paech predicts, in the realm of blockchain 
financial networks we are very unlikely to see unpermissioned financial blockchain networks rolled 
out on a mass basis because states will recognise the critical nature of financial systems as essential 
public infrastructure, and may therefore prohibit regulated financial institutions from dealing with or 
upon them.  Paech argues that blockchain financial networks are much more likely to take the form of 
permissioned networks, involving clear control nodes which can readily be rendered subservient to 
national regulatory authority51.  Although unpermissioned blockchain networks might continue to 
operate, Paech suggests that states could seek to limit their interaction with the financial system by, 
for example, making it impossible for these networks to deal with legal tender and continuing to 
regulate virtual currency exchanges and other interfaces between the network and the real world52. 
 
In summary, where blockchain networks are used intentionally to evade substantive legal obligations 
intended to protect individuals and the public interest (by seeking to protect the public from harm or 
to help finance the operations of the state), national legal systems are unlikely to sit idly by, 
particularly if these activities are non-trivial in size and scale.53 We can therefore anticipate an active 
                                                        
47  See for example recent statements by the US Secretary of the Treasury that his department was 
scrutinizing illegal uses of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, and that it is important that they are not used for 
‘illicit’ purposes: https://www.coindesk.com/us-treasury-secretary-were-looking-carefully-at-illicit-uses-of-
bitcoin/ (accessed 4 December 2017). 
 
48  The Blackett Review, supra n.6, at 34.  See also Wright, Aaron and Primavera De Filippi (2015) 
‘Decentralised Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographica’ available via SSRN network at 
www.ssrn.com.   
 
49  Paech supra n.45; Boucher supra n.2.    
 
50  Paech supra n.45. although the Blackett review seemed reasonably optimistic about the prospects of 
governments finding effective ways to regulate blockchain by influencing the technical code that defines their 
rules: The Blackett Review, supra n 6, at 45. 
 
51  Paech, supra n.45, at 1101-1103. 
 
52  Peach, ibid.  This view is supported by the Blackett review, which noted the emerging belief that the 
technology underpinning Bitcoin could have valuable and benign uses and enable significant future innovation.  
It took view the view that Bitcoin’s censorship resistance is problematic from a law-enforcement and regulation 
perspective, and it is therefore unlikely that major corporates or banks will engage closely with Bitcoin or related 
technologies in the short to medium term: The Blackett Review, supra n. 6 at 34. 
 
53  As Blackett observed, in addition to the interests of system stakeholders, there may also be broader 
interests involved in how a distributed ledger functions.  For example, regulators may wish to collect taxes, 
prosecute crimes and limit the use of a distributed ledger for criminal purposes.  If a system is adopted to the 
extent that it starts to have potential knock-on effects elsewhere in society, regulators may also wish to ensure 
that the system is resilient against systemic risk and market failure: The Blackett Review, supra n.6 at 44. 
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‘battle for supremacy’ in which the code of law attempts to exert its sovereign authority over code as 
law to close off opportunities for actors to exploit the anonymised interactions which public 
blockchains make possible.  This battle is, unlikely, however, to take the form of a single, monumental 
winner-take-all ‘fight for survival’, but a series of on-going ‘cat and mouse’ interactions in which 
national legal authorities seek to close off loop-holes that some blockchain users attempt to exploit to 
evade the law’s substantive demands.  In this dynamic interaction, the identity of the ‘mice’ upon 
whom national legal authorities set their sights may change over time.  Although ideally the state 
might wish to target the primary culprits, that is, those who actively seek to evade substantive laws 
by utilising blockchain, the state is likely to find it more effective and convenient to target the 
intermediaries and other gatekeepers who act as interfaces between blockchain networks and the real-
world54.  But, as the need for intermediaries evaporates as more services and placed on 
unpermissioned blockchains, national legal systems might seek to target and impose legal 
responsibilities on code developers and miners directly: although whether they can do successfully in 
practice will, at least for the time being, remain unanswered.55 
 
2.2.2 Efficient alignment 
 
(a) Blockchain to support and enhance the efficient enforcement of conventional law 
 
The relationship between blockchain and conventional legal systems is not necessarily hostile.  On the 
contrary, blockchain systems can be configured to help secure compliance with substantive legal 
norms.  These are referred to in recent policy literature as ‘RegTech’ (as shorthand for ‘Regulatory 
Technology’). As the UK’s Blackett Review observed:  
 
‘there are also opportunities to take advantage of the potential interactions between legal and technical 
code.  For example, public regulatory influence could be exerted through a combination of legal and 
technical code, rather than through legal code as at present.  In essence, technical code could be used to 
assure compliance with legal code, and in so doing, reduce the costs of legal compliance.  This could 
provide a ‘use case’ for the use of technology to enhance regulation, so-called RegTech’ (at p 12) 56 
                                                        
 
54  Wright and De Filippi, supra n 31.  Leiser, Mark, and Andrew Murray (2017) ‘The Role of Non-State 
Actors in the Governance of New and Emerging Technologies’ In Roger Brownsword, Eloise Scotford and Karen 
Yeung (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation and Technology, 670-704. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
55  The Blackett review considered the possibility of regulating blockchain via technical code, noting that 
some technical code (comprising software and protocols) emerge from the public sector, such as TCP/IP and 
other core internet protocols which, together with other international multi-stakeholder processes, point to the 
possibility of public involvement and democratic representation in the production of technical code – public 
regulation of technical code as opposed to legal code.  So, applied to distributed ledger systems, this could mean 
anything from instituting multi-stakeholder processes for maintaining technical code, to developing public 
standards for the code.  If this allowed the governments or the public directly to attain legitimate regulatory 
goals by influencing the rules built into the computer code, it could lessen the need for a body of new legal code 
to regulate these systems.  See The Blackett Review 2016, supra n.6, at 44-45. 
 
56  The UK’s Chief Scientific Adviser refers ‘RegTech’ as encompassing ‘any technological innovation that 
can be applied to or used in regulation, typically to improve efficiency and transparency’ Government Office for 
Science (2015) Fintech Futures: The UK as a World Leader in Financial Technologies. London, 47.  The Report 
notes that, within the financial services sector, ‘FinTech’ (ie ‘financial technologies integrate finance and 
technology in ways that will disrupt traditional financial models and businesses and provide an array of new 
services and businesses and consumers.  The hybridisation of technology with the traditional processes of 
finance – working capital, supply chain, payments processing, deposit accounts, life assurance and so on – 
replaces traditional structures and ways of working with new technology-based processes’ at 5) can be utilised 
to create new mechanisms for RegTech  - by applying them to regulation and compliance to make financial 
regulation and reporting more transparent, efficient and effective’ and to ‘improve the process of regulation’ at 
12.  The report identifies four key groups of technology advancement that it believes will enable the FinTech 
sector in the near and medium term: (a) machine learning and cognitive computing (b) digital currencies and 
blockchain (c) big data analytics, optimisation and fusion, and (d) distributed systems, mobile payments and peer 
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An example of blockchain-based RegTech is R3’s Corda project, established by a group of regulated 
financial institutions (including Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, Credit Suisse, JPMorgan, Deutsche 
Bank, and UBS) which seeks to design, construct and implement a distributed ledger platform to 
record, manage and synchronise legal agreements between their proper parties.  R3s Corda platform57 
is a permissioned system, so only the relevant parties share the transactions, and the other 
transactions are not known to others or made visible. Although its data structure is not actually a 
blockchain, and the platform does not use ‘proof of work’, it is a distributed ledger that operates 
through basic distributed consensus58. Unlike typical cryptocurrrencies, the Corda platform is 
designed to supplement and complement existing legal structures, so that the ledger’s operation is 
intended to give effect to the rights and obligations expressed in legally enforceable contracts 
expressed in conventional linguistic text (referred to by Corda as ‘legal prose’).  Accordingly the 
platform has been designed to allow the legal prose to be attached to the node that is intended to 
verify and automate the execution of the obligations arising under the legal agreement. 59   In so 
doing, Corda’s developers explicitly recognise that complex contractual disputes can and do arise, so 
that the legal obligations of the participants of the platform are intended to prevail in the event of a 
dispute entailing conflict between the legal obligations arising under the agreement and the 
operations taking place upon the Corda platform.  In other words, the Corda platform expressly 
eschews the assertion that, for the purposes of the platform’s operation and governance, ‘code is law’. 
60   
 
By explicitly acknowledging that the legal rights and obligations of participants arising under 
conventional legal contracts ultimately govern the relationship takings place upon the network, this 
serves Corda’s overarching goal, which is ‘to define a shared ledger fabric for the financial services 
use-cases that can be deployed within existing legal frameworks which relies on proven 
technologies’.61  But Corda’s vision extends beyond merely enhancing the efficiency, effectiveness and 
timeliness of transactions between private financial institutions, for it also seeks to bolster the efficacy 
of oversight by financial and other related regulators by providing a technical means through which 
they can access real time information about transactions taking place between the participants.  So, for 
example, the Corda platform might permit regulators to view transactions upon it to identify any 
suspicious transactions in terms of fraud, money laundering or other indicators of criminal activity.62  
Corda’s proposal thus represents a concrete example of ‘RegTech’ envisioned in several policy 
                                                        
to peer applications (at 7). Recommendation 10 of the report provides that: ‘Regulators should engage the 
FinTech community in automating regulation and compliance to create a state-of-the-art regulatory reporting 
and analytics infrastructure, which we have called ‘RegTech’ (at 12). 
 
57  Corda version 1.0 was released on 3 October 2017 and is available on an open source basis: 
https://www.r3.com/blog/2017/10/03/introducing-corda-1-0/. 
 
58  Distributed ledgers are a type of database that is spread across multiple sites, countries or institutions 
and is typically public.  Records are stored one after the other in a continuous ledger, rather than sorted into 
blocks, but they can only be added when the participants reach a quorum: see The Blackett Review, 17-18. 
 
59  See https://docs.corda.net/key-concepts-contracts.html accessed 10 November 2017. 
 
60  See https://docs.corda.net/key-concepts-contracts.html accessed 10 November 2017. 
 
61  Brown, Richard Gendal, James Carlyle, Ian Grigg, and Mike Hearn. "Corda: An Introduction."  
https://docs.corda.net/_static/corda-introductory-whitepaper.pdf. (accessed 29 November 2017) 
 
62  See https://discourse.corda.net/t/how-does-the-corda-prevent-using-it-for-an-illegal-purposes-e-g-for-
money-laundering/1230 (accessed 10 November 2017) 
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documents, with the state of Illinois becoming the first government regulator to join the R3 
consortium.63 
 
(b)  Mutually supportive interaction between code of law and code as law 
 
Corda’s founders intend that their distributed ledger should operate, in effect, as a servant of 
conventional law.  No formal ‘battle for supremacy’ between these two regulatory modalities arises 
because the technical network is intentionally embedded within conventional law, building upon and 
actively supporting conventional law’s authority over network participants’ relationships and 
dealings.  Nevertheless, one might anticipate informal tension to arise on occasion, at least in 
circumstances where either formal legal rights and obligations do not translate readily into the binary 
language of technical code, or if the interactions between the parties on the network fail accurately to 
reflect their rights and obligations arising under the legal instruments on which they rest.  The 
resulting dynamic interaction between the two systems might therefore be described as akin to the 
‘joys of marriage’ – within an on-going, dynamic relationship that occasionally entails disagreement 
and discord but ultimately seeks to provide long term mutual support and collaboration for the benefit 
of both partners.  Because the stability of the relationship is assured by the willingness of one partner 
to accept and defer to the superior authority of the other, rather than a partnership of equals, the 
resulting dynamic is perhaps more aptly described as the ‘joys of patriarchal marriage’.  For example, 
as legal philosophers have long observed, there will always be an inevitable element of ambiguity and 
uncertainty associated with linguistic texts, including legal prose.  
 
It is also conceivable that the contractual agreement between the parties who have sought to 
implement their agreement via blockchain-enabled smart contracts may have unintended adverse 
effects upon third parties.64  For example, consider a master contract between two major financial 
institutions concerning the terms that are intended to apply to their dealings, including the terms and 
conditions that they propose to apply to their respective customers at the retail level.  These parties 
may then wish to implement their legal arrangements via ‘smart contracts’ that can be built on top of 
a distributed ledger.  As Finck explains, a smart contract is not in fact a legal contract, and nor are 
they ‘smart’ in that they need outside input to determine real world events.  Instead, a smart contract 
is a computer programme code that automates the verification, execution and enforcement of certain 
terms and conditions of an arrangement.65  It is conceivable that, for example, smart contracts used to 
execute the parties’ agreement unintentionally cause harm or produce other adverse third party 
effects.66  A question then arises concerning how those third parties might seek redress: if the 
                                                        
63  Rutland, Emily (2017) ‘Illinois becomes first state level regulator to join R3 distributed ledger group’ at  
http://www.r3cev.com/press/2017/3/21/illinois-becomes-first-state-level-regulator-to-join-r3-distributed-
ledger-group (accessed 29 November 2017). 
 
64  In English contract law, even if third parties are explicitly intended to benefit from a contract between 
two contracting parties, if they are not themselves party to the contract then there is no ‘privity of contract’ with 
the result that those third parties do not have any rights under the English common law to enforce the terms of 
the contract against the contracting parties. 
 
65  M Finck, supra n.23, 6.  Werbach describes smart contracts as, in essence, autonomous software 
agents, enabling a distributed ledger to function as a distributed computer, so that the same consensus 
algorithms that allow each node to have an identical copy of the ledger allow it to perform identical 
computations: Werbach, K. (2016). ‘Trustless Trust.’ SSRN network, 31.  The term ‘smart contract’ was originally 
conceived by Nick Szabo, who defined a smart contract as ‘a computerised transaction protocol that executes 
the terms of a contract’.  The general objectives of smart contract design are to satisfy common contractual 
conditions (such as payment terms, liens, confidentiality and even enforcement), minimise exceptions both 
malicious and accidental, and minimize the need for trusted intermediaries.  Related economic goals include 
lowering fraud, loss, arbitration and enforcement costs, and other transaction costs: see 
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.
best.vwh.net/smart.contracts.html (accessed 4 June 2018) 
 
66  See discussion at section 3.2 below. 
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contracting parties are committed to fully reflecting the rights and obligations arising under 
conventional law in their dealings both on and off the blockchain, then one would expect them to be 
sympathetic to third party concerns and to seek to devise arrangements that would reflect the 
allocation of rights and duties that would be enforceable under conventional law.  If, however, affected 
third parties are unable successfully to enlist the support of the blockchain community to implement 
an appropriate solution67, they might look to the conventional law for assistance.  If so, then such 
blockchain applications would no longer be appropriately classed as ‘mutually aligned’ with 
conventional law, resembling the class of case that are motivated by a desire to ‘alleviate transactional 
friction’, discussed more fully in the following subsection. 
 
Just as some blockchain developers, such Corda’s founders, have openly embraced conventional law 
and invited interactions between them, so also have national law makers taken active steps to 
welcome, and provide legal recognition of, blockchain forms of interaction, albeit also on the 
understanding that the code of law prevails over code as law.   Various legislative reforms have been 
proposed or adopted in several jurisdictions, in which national legal regimes have sought to provide 
legal recognition of the validity of transactions undertaken on blockchain systems, thereby reducing 
legal uncertainty and bolstering their attractiveness to potential users.  For example, in March 2017 
Arizona passed legislation which clarifies enforceability issues associated with the use of blockchain 
and smart contracts under Arizona law68, while in the Isle of Man, policy makers are proposing to 
amend its Proceeds of Crime Act 2008 to embrace cryptocurrencies, thus providing a safe haven for 
digital currency projects, with the aim of attracting blockchain start-ups in the hope that these will 
fuel the kind of economic boom it saw arise from its early embrace of online gambling and electronic 
gaming.69 In a different but related vein, Australia’s federal Parliament has passed legislation so that 
Australians will no longer be required to pay taxation on cryptocurrency purchases, thus bringing 
them into line with the tax treatment of other foreign currencies.70  Although the motivations of law-
makers underpinning these legislative measures varies in the extent to which particular jurisdictions 
are willing to welcome blockchain systems, from grudging acceptance through to actively seeking to 
attract their development, they collectively reveal an attitude of acceptance.   
 
In summary, where blockchain systems are developed for the explicit purpose of supporting and 
partnering with conventional legal systems by providing mechanisms through which legally 
enforceable rights and obligations can be executed and implemented with considerably greater speed, 
efficiency, security and reliability that is currently possible via conventional legal enforcement 
mechanisms, the resulting dynamic interaction between the systems can be described in terms of the 
‘joys of (patriachial) marriage’.  At the same time, at least within liberal legal regimes in which 
‘anything not prohibited is permitted’, some conventional law-making bodies have enacted legislation 
to recognise the validity of transactions taking place upon blockchain systems, reflecting an attitude 
ranging from tolerance to encouragement. Although these measures are intended to avoid any overt 
‘battle for supremacy’ between the code of law and code as law, implicit in this approach is an 
assumption that ultimately, the sovereign authority of conventional law prevails.  Whether or not this 
position is sustainable in practice is a question which is addressed in the next section. 
 
                                                        
 
67  See discussion at section 3.2 concerning The DAO Hack, particularly the willingness of the majority of 
nodes to implement the ‘hard fork’ solution recommended by Ethereum’s lead developers.   
 
68  See https://www.coindesk.com/arizona-smart-contract-clarity-winning-startups/ 
 
69  See https://www.coindesk.com/isle-of-man-bitcoin-regulation-2015/ 
 
70  See http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/new-laws-stop-double-taxation-on-
bitcoin/news-story/80bd73cff2abe4a86552a04e0d8240d7 accessed on 10 November 2017.  Australian Tax 
Office (2014) Tax Determination, TD 2014/25,  ‘Is bitcoin a ‘foreign currency’ the purposes of Division 775 of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997, available at 
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?DocID=TXD/TD201425/NAT/ATO/00001 (accessed 4 December 2017). 
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2.2.3 Alleviating transactional friction 
 
Thus far I have identified two opposing attitudes towards conventional law that might be evinced by 
some blockchain participants: one concerned to avoid the substantive obligations imposed by 
conventional law, while the other seeks to support and giving effect to the substantive obligations 
imposed by conventional law.  But a third set of attitudes and motivations can be identified, lying 
between these two poles: those motivated to use blockchain primarily to undertake novel forms of 
cooperation without the procedural burdens, costs and formalities of conventional forms of legal 
coordination.  In this section, I argue that conventional legal systems will be hesitant and cautious in 
responding to these blockchain systems, producing a relationship dynamic of ‘uneasy co-existence’ 
characterised by an attitude of ‘mutual suspicion’.  
 
(a) Using blockchain to support novel forms of social coordination 
 
Much of the enthusiasm for blockchain arises from its potential to enable novel forms of effective and 
trustworthy social cooperation between strangers without the procedural burdens and costs of 
conventional law.  Because Bitcoin has been used by cybercriminals to extort payment from victims of 
ransomware attacks71 and to pay for contraband via the darknet, it is often associated with criminal 
activity.  But the origins of Bitcoin were rooted in a loss of faith in the convention global financial 
system following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.  This provoked a discussion within the crypto 
community about whether a currency exchange system could be developed which avoided the 
conventional financial system (and thus its reliance on major financial institutions and conventional 
legal institutions to guarantee the security of transactions).  In other words, one significant advantage 
of blockchain to effect social coordination between strangers (including but not limited to 
cryptocurrency applications) is its capacity to avoid many of the weaknesses associated with 
conventional law to guarantee the security of transactions, particularly given that invoking the formal 
legal processes to enforcing legal rights and obligations is typically slow, time-consuming, labour 
intensive, uncertain and costly72.  Even in highly developed, stable economic systems with well-
established legal systems, the delay and expense associated with formal legal proceedings means that 
it is rarely invoked, regarded in practice as available only to the rich and powerful.73   
 
Accordingly, one important driver of innovation in blockchain applications is a desire to avoid the 
procedural, economic and temporal shortcomings of conventional law, and which might, all other 
things being equal, plausibly be regarded as a legitimate objective.  The response of conventional law 
to these applications is contingent on identifying whether, and in what ways, legal intervention into 
blockchain systems is considered necessary or desirable and practically feasible.  Two recent and 
emerging applications illustrate the challenges faced by conventional legal systems in making this 
evaluation: first, crowdfunding for start-up ventures via ‘initial coin offerings’ and secondly, peer-to-
peer energy exchange platforms.   In both cases, blockchain is being utilised and imagined as a vehicle 
for establishing and maintaining community-based cooperation between network participants in 
which the procedural inefficiency, friction and costs associated with the conventional legal processes 
can be avoided, rather than (arguably) motivated predominantly by a desire to evade substantive legal 
obligations. Conventional legal systems have responded to applications of the first kind in a tentative 
and piecemeal fashion, resulting in ICOs occupying a ‘regulatory greyzone’. The resulting interaction 
between the code of law and code as law can therefore be described as one of uneasy coexistence, outlined 
in the following discussion. 
                                                        
71  Gibbs, Samuel (2017) ‘Wannacry: Hackers Withdraw £108,000 of Bitcoin Ransom’ The Guardian, 3 
August at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/03/wannacry-hackers-withdraw-108000-
pounds-bitcoin-ransom. 
 
72  Yeung, Karen (2017) ‘Blockchain, Transactional Security and the Promise of Automated Law 
Enforcement: The Withering of Freedom under Law?’ In Philipp Otto and Eike Graf (eds.) 3ETH1CS - the 
Reinvention of Ethics in a Digital Age, 132-46. Berlin: iRights.Media. 
 
73  Bach, Lord Willy (2016) The Crisis in the Justice System in England and Wales, Interim Report." The 
Fabian Society, London.   
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(b) Initial coin offerings: a blockchain-based approach to crowdfunding 
 
The recent proliferation of so-called ‘initial coin offerings’ (ICOs) vividly illustrates how blockchain is 
being utilised to enable novel forms of social and economic co-ordination.  ICOs have, to date, been 
both enormously popular and highly controversial, with the New York Times reporting in July 2017 
that $US 1 billion has been raised through ICOs since the beginning of that year.74 The current crop 
of ICOs take one of two forms.  Some are ‘token sales’, in which those who purchase tokens (or 
‘appcoins’) are intended to acquire a right to participate in the activities of the token issuer, for 
instance, to purchase its products and services on a preferential basis once they are available.  For 
example, a token might enable the holder to buy data storage or cybersecurity services from a new 
start-up that has yet to launch75.  Other ICOs, known as ‘coin offerings’, are intended to confer upon 
those acquiring coins a form of property, sometimes in the form of fractional ownership in the 
underlying enterprise, or its future profits, so that coins are analogous to digital stock certificates.  
Trade in tokens is recorded using blockchain and investors can typically trade their tokens on 
secondary peer-to-peer exchanges, as investors speculate on their value.  
 
Considerable controversy has arisen concerning the appropriate legal and regulatory response to 
ICOs, owing to uncertainty concerning whether they should be regarded as akin to public offerings of 
securities (IPOs) and thus subject to the same regulatory requirements to ensure investor protection.  
ICOs are financing vehicles developed to fund venture-style investments, purporting to give ordinary 
investors opportunities to invest in exciting start-up projects that would typically only be available to 
private equity investors.  They have therefore been described as a ‘cross between crowdfunding and a 
conventional equity IPO’76 making it possible for anyone to buy ‘coins’ in a venture fund that is 
typically claimed to be fully transparent and, in many cases, purportedly under complete shareholder 
control, by giving coin-holders a voice in the form of voting rights concerning which products and 
projects to fund while receiving an equity stake in the startup’s outcome. Because expected returns are 
directly linked both to the pooled funds of the ICO and the issuer’s efforts to employ those funds to 
execute its proposed plans to generate returns, participants are effectively investing in the on-going 
commercial proposition: if the value of their appcoin holdings increases, they either earn a greater 
financial return by selling the tokens (capital gains) or gain more credit to access the underlying 
product or services.  Accordingly, the rights attached to these coins can be understood as directly 
analogous to ordinary securities to which attendant voting rights, rights to benefits and potential 
involvement in management decisions attach and, owing to the risks to investors of harm and 
exploitation by the securities issuer, are subject to stringent legal regulation.77  In part, controversy 
surrounding ICOs is rooted in recognition that the procedural burdens of securities legislation are 
ultimately intended to provide substantive protection to the investing public and should not be readily 
side-stepped by entrepreneurs using blockchain to fund their risky ventures. 
 
                                                        
74  N Popper ‘SEC Issues Warning on Initial Coin Offerings’, The New York Times, 25 July 2017 at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/business/sec-issues-warning-on-initial-coin-offerings.html. (accessed 29 
November 2017). 
 
75  N Popper ‘Easiest Path to Riches on the Web? An Initial Coin Offering’, The New York Times, 23 June 
2017 at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/business/dealbook/coin-digital-
currency.html?action=click&contentCollection=DealBook&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtyp
e=article (accessed 29 November 2017). 
 
76  Schiller, Ben (2017) ‘Can Initial Coin Offerings Give New Life to Social Good Companies?’ Fast Company, 
15 September at https://www.fastcompany.com/40456378/can-initial-coin-offerings-give-new-life-to-social-
good-companies (accessed 29 November 2017). 
 
77  Sehra, Avtar, Philip Smith, and Philip Gomes (2017) ‘Economics of Initial Coin Offerings’, Allen & Overy, 
available at http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Economics-of-Initial-Coin-Offerings.aspx 
(accessed 29 November 2017). 
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Regulators in major financial markets have all responded to ICOs78, adopting a largely cautious, ‘wait 
and see’ approach to ICOs rather than treating them as all subject to, or free from, regulation as 
ordinary equity securities.79  Thus both the USA’s Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC)80 
and the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) have issued warnings, essentially stating that the 
offer and sale of digital tokens may be regulated as securities but will be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis81.  The resulting uncertainty leaves fundraisers and investors facing different rules and 
expectations over how ICOs will be treated in different parts of the world, prompting critics to 
characterise ICOs as a ‘Wild West’ of financial services in which ICOs constitute a form of 
‘workarounds’ that seek to ‘leverage regulatory arbitrage opportunities to execute undercover 
securities issuances’, potentially limiting the vision and creativity required to see the true scale of 
what ICOs and digital tokens could represent, while blinding the industry to possible risk.82   
                                                        
 
78  Scanlon, Luke (2017) ‘Regulators Playing Catch-up on Initial Coin Offerings,’ Outlaw.com, 8 September 
available at https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2017/september/regulators-playing-catch-up-on-initial-coin-
offerings/ (accessed 29 November 2017). 
 
79  See response of SEC (USA) and FCA (UK) referred to below at n.60 and n.61.  See also Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (2017) ‘MAS clarifies regulatory position on the offer of digital tokens in Singapore’, 1 
August, available at http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2017/MAS-clarifies-
regulatory-position-on-the-offer-of-digital-tokens-in-Singapore.aspx (accessed 4 December 2017); Canadian 
Securities Administration (2017) ‘Cryptocurrency Offerings’, CSA Staff Notice 46-307, 24 August, available at 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20170824_cryptocurrency-offerings.htm#N_1_1_1_1_ 
(accessed 4 November 2017); and Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (2017) ‘Statement on initial 
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statements-and-announcements/statement-on-initial-coin-offerings.html (accessed 4 December 2017). 
 
80  Securities and Exchange Commission (2017) Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, 25 July. 
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2.3.3 Blockchain for cooperative energy generation, sharing and distribution 
 
In many ways, ICOs resemble well-established public fund-raising strategies and thus neither radical 
nor revolutionary, at least in substance rather than form.  Other emerging blockchain applications, 
however, better reflect the revolutionary vision that blockchain advocates seek to champion, including 
those aimed at enabling peer-to-peer energy generation and distribution.  Various energy projects 
around the world83 are currently being developed using blockchain platforms to enable people to 
generate, sell and buy energy directly to and from each other.  For example, the ‘Brooklyn Microgrid’ 
project by TransactiveGrid84 aims to test how blockchain technology can enable direct neighbour-to-
neighbour sale of solar energy, building on the Ethereum blockchain.  Since April 2016, it has been 
running a pilot project that seeks to integrate buildings, each with rooftop photovoltaics systems, in a 
decentralised peer-to-peer power grid.  All energy not used by the buildings themselves is sold to five 
neighbouring buildings, all of which are also interconnected through the conventional power grid, 
with transactions managed and stored using a central blockchain.85  The same underlying logic is 
evident in the ambitions of WePower, a blockchain energy start-up which, although yet to launch at 
the time of writing, is currently gathering together producers of renewable energy including solar, 
wind and hydro plants while seeking investors who pay upfront for the right to consume electricity 
generated by those plants by purchasing its own cryptocurrency, a token called WPR, which 
represents one 1kw hour of power produced and which are themselves tradeable on the platform.  By 
tokenising renewable energy and putting it onto a blockchain, WePower seeks to make that power 
tradeable and accessible to anyone.  In effect, people taking contracts on WePower become their own 
energy traders, substituting for the role utilities play in buying and selling power on our behalf.  
Hence, rather than showing the price of energy set by a utility company, their bills will show the price 
they have negotiated on the blockchain platform, although households will still have to pay the cost of 
grid transmission and distribution.86  
 
Critical to the operation of these platforms is the fully automated smart contract.87  In theory, smart 
contracts could be used to signal when to initiate a transaction based on predefined rules aimed at 
ensuring that all energy and storage flows are controlled automatically to balance supply and demand. 
For example, whenever energy production exceeds demand, smart contracts could ensure that surplus 
energy is automatically delivered into storage and deployed whenever demand exceeds supply.  Smart 
                                                        
83  These projects include those undertaken by Power Ledger, which has several blockchain pilot projects 
in Australia; Drift has launched a blockchain based utility in New York; Vattenfall has launched a start-up 
company ‘powerpeers’ in the Netherlands; Various firms are involved with the Energy Web Foundation, a non-
profit group founded by the Rocky Mountain Institute and Grid Singularity; and an Austrian blockchain developer 
focused on energy applications: see PriceWaterhouse Coopers (2016) Blockchain - an Opportunity for Energy 
Producers and Consumers? Available at www.pwc.utilities/ (accessed 29 November 2017); Schiller, Ben (2017) 
‘Can Initial Coin Offerings Give New Life to Social Good Companies?’ Fast Company, 15 September at 
https://www.fastcompany.com/40456378/can-initial-coin-offerings-give-new-life-to-social-good-companies 
(accessed 29 November 2017). 
 
84  TransactivGrid is a joint venture between L03 Energy and ConsensSys see https://lo3energy.com/ 
(accessed 29 November 2017). 
 
85  Cardwell, Diane. "Solar Experiment Lets Neighbors Trade Energy among Themselves." The New York 
Times, 13 March 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/13/business/energy-environment/brooklyn-solar-
grid-energy-trading.html. 
 
86  Schiller, Ben (2017) ‘Can Initial Coin Offerings Give New Life to Social Good Companies?’ Fast Company, 
15 September at https://www.fastcompany.com/40456378/can-initial-coin-offerings-give-new-life-to-social-
good-companies (accessed 29 November 2017). 
 
87  See above at n 65 above and associated text.  See also Raskin, Max (2017) ‘The Law and Legality of 
Smart Contracts’ Georgetown Law Technology Review 1: 305. 
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contracts between the energy producer and consumer could also autonomously and securely regulate 
both supply and payment so that if a customer fails to make a payment, the smart contract would 
automatically arrange for the power supply to be suspended until payment is received (provided the 
parties had previously agreed to include such a mechanism in their contract).88   
 
These blockchain energy projects have yet to move beyond the concept or pilot stage, so that 
conventional law-makers and energy regulators have not needed to take a formal position on the 
extent to which they are subject to national law.  Given that there are well-established energy laws 
and regulatory requirements concerned with ensuring safety and security of supply and quality, 
protecting vulnerable consumers, and regulating disputes between suppliers and providers, it seems 
highly unlikely that conventional law-makers, regulators and enforcement officials would regard these 
systems as beyond the reach of national law, at least if successfully scaled up to enable mass energy 
distribution and consumption via blockchain networks89.  It is worth noting, however, that the 
technical and governance challenges associated with implementing these systems at scale are very 
significant.90   
 
The energy sector differs critically from the financial services sector, however, in that the physical 
product itself (ie the electricity) must be taken into account.  Transactions on blockchain energy 
networks involve not only values and information but also the trading of energy delivered via 
network infrastructure.  If blockchain-based distributed energy generation and distribution systems 
remain at the small scale, neighbourhood level, national legal systems might be reluctant to intervene 
except when called upon to do so by network participants seeking the legal system’s assistance to 
resolve a particular dispute, particularly if these systems are expressly and clearly stated to be 
governed exclusively by the internal rules and technical architecture of the system (which might 
include internal dispute resolution mechanisms).  But even in the case of small-scale blockchain 
networks, it is highly unlikely that national legal systems would refrain from insisting that core legal 
obligations aimed at ensuring basic requirements to safeguard health, safety and security are complied 
with.   
 
(d) A relationship of uneasy coexistence and mutual suspicion? 
 
Initial coin offerings (ICOs) and peer-to-peer energy generation systems illustrate both the potential 
of blockchain to enable novel forms of peer-to-peer social and economic co-operation and the dilemma 
faced by conventional law-makers in responding to them.   While these applications are in their 
infancy and their future trajectory and take-up remains unknown, conventional law-makers are 
keeping their powder largely dry.  For the time being, they have avoided systematically attempting to 
exert their sovereign authority, resulting in a relationship of ‘uneasy co-existence’ between these two 
regulatory modalities.    At the same time, those seeking to build novel blockchain applications are 
equally likely to be suspicious of conventional law, given their desire to foster and enable novel forms 
of social co-operation without the procedural burdens, delays and costs typically associated with 
conventional legal mechanisms, resulting in an attitude of ‘mutual suspicion’ between the two 
systems. 
 
                                                        
88  PriceWaterhouse Coopers, supra, n.83. 
 
89  In the UK, following the privatization of major utilities, statutory regulation was introduced, primarily 
due to fears of abuse of monopoly power, but also to ensure universal service obligations are met to ensure that 
the poor and vulnerable members of society are not left without basic utility provision.  Yet regulation did not 
wither away after competition in utilities market was introduced, and the utilities sector continues to be subject 
to regulatory oversight to ensure quality of service, disconnection, fair pricing, ensure community service 
obligations and the meeting of environmental targets: see Graham, Cosmo (1998) ‘Is There a Crisis in Regulatory 
Accountability?’ In Robert Baldwin, Colin Scott and Christopher Hood (eds), A Reader on Regulation, 482. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
90  PriceWaterhouse Coopers, supra n.83. 
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3. Normative tensions and shifting public-private boundaries: should the code of law win 
the battle for supremacy over code as law? 
 
The preceding analysis has identified three different kinds of interaction between blockchain systems 
and conventional legal orders, determined primarily by the motives of network participants in 
utilising blockchain systems with respect to conventional law, represented in Table 1 (below).  
 
Table 1 
 
Motives of blockchain participants vis-à-
vis conventional law 
Dynamic interaction (battle for supremacy?) 
Hostile evasion Cat and mouse 
Supportive Alignment The joys of (patriarchal) marriage 
Alleviating Transactional Friction Mutual suspicion and uneasy co-existence  
 
In the cases of hostile evasion and supportive alignment, the assertion of the supremacy of national law 
over blockchain interactions can be readily understood.  In the former case, national legal systems are 
justified in taking coercive action against those within their jurisdiction who seek to evade substantive 
laws intended to protect individuals and the community from harm and exploitation.  In latter case, 
the supremacy of conventional law over blockchain code is both intended by its developers and 
normatively desirable, not only to support the legitimate intention of developers, but also in 
strengthening the practical application and effect of legal rights and duties arising under national law.  
However, blockchain applications motivated by a desire to establish novel forms of cooperation via 
blockchain technologies that avoid the procedural and associated burdens of conventional law are 
more difficult to evaluate in normative terms.   
 
3.1 How will national legal authorities balance competing claims for and against 
intervention? 
 
The political claims associated with the third class of blockchain applications display similarities with 
those made by advocates of the ‘sharing economy’ that has emerged as digital aggregation platforms 
have proliferated.  Supporters celebrate the ‘freedom’ these platforms provide by enabling individuals 
to connect with each other, untethering them from established institutions, often accompanied by 
triumphant claims of transition, disruption or even revolution.91  This family of blockchain 
applications take this logic further, enabling direct peer-to-peer interaction by dispensing with a 
central intermediary altogether and replacing it with the underlying distributed computer network.  
Leaving aside this ideological rhetoric, they present conventional legal systems with a conundrum.  
On the one hand, liberal democratic constitutional systems rest on a political commitment to respect 
individual freedom and autonomy, but, they are also firmly committed to the rule of law and its 
generality, equality and the universality of its protection on the other.  It is therefore not surprising 
that blockchain applications of this kind are jurisprudentially contestable and normatively ambiguous.  
The sovereignty of law in contemporary democratic orders can be understood as rooted in the idea of 
the social contract pursuant to which citizens willingly forgo some of their liberty in return for the 
state’s guarantee of security92. This social contract is grounded in an understanding that the proper 
role of the state is to protect its citizens against harm caused by others to which they have not 
consented, in return for which citizens voluntarily cede some of their freedom.  It follows that, if 
individuals are fully informed of the risks associated with a particular set of activities, and clearly 
indicate their willingness to engage in them, it is arguably not the role of the state to override their 
arrangements for this would exceed the terms of the implied social contract. Yet there are limits on 
the extent to which even liberal states permit individuals to voluntarily assume certain risks.93  But 
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identifying how much liberty citizens of liberal democratic states can appropriately forgo is often a 
matter of intense disagreement.94   
 
This uncertainty in finding the appropriate balance between respect for individual freedom, on the one 
hand, and the need to protect individuals from harm on the other, is arguably reflected in the cautious, 
tentative approach taken by national regulators in response to ICOs referred to above.  One strategy 
that some national regulators have adopted, which helps resolve this uncertainty and allay industry 
and consumer suspicion, is by seeking to cultivate a cooperative relationship with blockchain 
developers through the use of ‘regulatory sandboxes’.  Pioneered by the UK’s Financial Conduct 
Authority in June 2016 as recommended by the UK’s Chief Scientific Officer95, a regulatory sandbox is 
an ‘experimental’ approach in which the regulator provides selected firms wishing to bring innovative 
services that rely on new technological applications to market with an opportunity to trial their 
services with real customers and market participants within a designated domain for a specified 
period, subject to monitoring and oversight by the regulator to safeguard against undue risks and 
harms to the public96.  In its recent report on lessons learned from the regulatory sandbox’s first year 
of operation, the FCA observed that distributed ledger technologies were the most popular innovation 
that applicant firms sought to develop, concluding that initial evidence suggests that the sandbox had 
been very successful.97   
 
This experimental regulatory approach has been rapidly emulated by other financial regulators, 
including those in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Montreal, the Isle of Man, Australia, Bahrain, 
Thailand and Russia, all seeking to foster innovation in Fintech and encourage start-ups to operate 
within the regulatory fold.98   National regulators hope that regulatory sandboxes, at least in the 
financial services sector, will enable the development of blockchain and other emerging technologies 
by fintech entrepreneurs that will generate social benefits, whilst addressing any associated harms and 
risks effects swiftly and in a cooperative fashion.  In other words, by enabling the supervised testing of 
innovative blockchain applications, regulators might help to prevent simmering suspicion between the 
code of law and code as law from erupting into hostility, thereby discouraging blockchain 
entrepreneurs from replicating Silicon Valley’s attitude towards conventional law, best epitomised in 
Facebook’s motto, ‘move fast and break things’ by rolling out technological innovations into the 
public domain as rapidly as possible without first seeking the advice or authority of conventional legal 
officials, hoping that rapid mass market take- up will render it politically and practically difficult (if 
not impossible) for regulators to intervene to prohibit or regulate their use.99 
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3.2 The rhetoric and reality of regulation by blockchain: The DAO Hack  
 
Given continuing uncertainty concerning the application of conventional law to blockchain 
interactions (including the ‘regulatory greyzone’ that ICOs currently occupy) there are real risks that 
the current legal and technical regime may fail to provide effective protection and accountability 
guarantees to network participants.100  These risks were vividly illuminated by the hacking incident 
occurring in one of the earliest attempts to crowdsource funds from the public by The DAO 
(shorthand for ‘Distributed Autonomous Organisation’) on the Ethereum Blockchain by Slock.It, its 
German co-founder and blockchain start-up.  The resulting ‘DAO Hack’ drew attention to overblown 
claims about the so-called ‘immutability’ of blockchain systems, while demonstrating that the 
technical nature of blockchain systems does not eliminate matters of subjectivity and political 
judgement in their development and operation.   The founders’ of the DAO intended to create a for-
profit entity that would establish a fund of assets through the sale of ‘DAO Tokens’ to investors, 
which would then be used to finance individual ‘projects’101 while DAO Token-holders could monetise 
their tokens by re-selling them on various web-based platforms that supported secondary trading in 
DAO Tokens.  The DAO sold approximately 1.15 billion DAO Tokens during the offer period in 
exchange for a total of approximately 12 million Ether (‘ETH’), the virtual currency used on the 
Ethereum Blockchain, which was then worth approximately US$150 mil.  But before The DAO 
commenced financing individual projects, an attacker used a flaw in The DAO’s computer code to 
divert approximately one third ($US 50 million) of The DAO’s assets from The DAO’s Ethereum 
Blockchain address to an Ethereum Blockchain address controlled by the attacker.  During the 27 
days following the attack (during which The DAO code prevented the movement of ETH out of the 
attacker’s account), a lively online debate ensued within the Ethereum community concerning how to 
respond to the attack. Three solutions were considered and debated (1) do nothing, (2) a soft fork, 
which would have added a patch to the Ethereum code to freeze the diverted Ether so that it could not 
be used, or (3) a hard fork, which would roll back the transactions in the blockchain and effectively 
reverse the attack.  In the event, Ethereum community members voted for the hard fork solution, 
which was undertaken in July 2016.   
 
While a detailed discussion of the attack and the hard fork solution are beyond the scope of this paper, 
for present purposes it is worth noting how the incident provoked a number of questions concerning 
blockchain governance, calling into question the relationship between blockchain code and 
conventional law.  In particular, the promotional material disseminated by The DAO’s co-founders 
sought explicitly to oust the jurisdiction of conventional law altogether, claiming that all The DAO 
activities were governed solely and exclusively by the software code upon which it was to operate, 
emphasising that investing in The DAO was especially risky, and issuing extensive disclaimers 
associated with the creation of DAO Tokens102.  Accordingly, some argued that because ‘code is law’ 
on The DAO, the attacker’s success in exploiting a flaw in the code constituted a legitimate action so 
that the attacker was entitled to the fruit of his or her efforts, despite the fact that, from the standpoint 
of an ordinary investor, it constituted a naked form of theft.  Because a hard fork was subsequently 
adopted, investors avoided significant losses and did not need to enlist the assistance of the 
conventional legal system to seek redress.  Although the US Securities & Enforcement Commission 
(SEC) declined to pursue criminal enforcement action against The DAO or Slock.It103, its 
investigation and report concluded that DAO Tokens satisfied the definition of ‘securities’ under 
federal legislation so that The DAO Token issue violated US securities law. 
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Had the Ethereum community taken no action in response to The DAO attack, whether conventional 
national regulators or other legal authorities would have been willing and able to reach into network 
to correct the effects of the attack is unknown.104  Nevertheless, the emerging regulatory response 
decisively rejects the claim of hard-line crypto anarchists who advocate a rugged ‘law of the jungle’ 
approach in which the blockchain code and protocols govern the network on a sole and exclusive 
basis.  National legal officials recognise that blockchain networks might harm participants if the 
network code and internal rules provide inadequate protection.  Moreover, even if one accepts that 
investors in The DAO had voluntarily assumed the risk of flaws in the technical code being exploited 
(given the warnings and disclaimers of liability issued by The DAO’s developers), third parties 
providing services to, and interacting with, The DAO could not plausibly be regarded as having 
consented to the disapplication of ordinary law to their dealings.  As Paech has persuasively argued in 
the context of blockchain financial networks, because these networks pose risks to third parties and to 
the stability of the market, the rights of participants cannot be left entirely to the software.105  He 
imagines hypothetical cases in which blockchain financial assets are held within the estate of an 
insolvent: if insolvency triggers the operation of smart contracts to automatically divest those assets, 
this may violate the pari passu principle that is foundational to conventional insolvency law, at the 
expense of insolvent’s general creditors who should, by law, rank equally in the recovery of claims 
against the insolvent.  In other words, although blockchain networks may purport to operate as 
hermetically sealed, closed systems, they invariably interface with the wider world, and thus affect the 
broader community who have legitimate rights, interests and expectations and which the nation state 
is normatively justified in protecting, if necessary through the exertion of sovereign power over the 
‘private’ arrangements of network participants. 
 
In many ways, the novel forms of social and economic interaction and organisation which blockchain 
technologies make possible exemplify how networked digital technologies are challenging existing 
social, political and cultural understandings and expectations of the public-private divide.   By 
enabling new forms of allegedly trustworthy peer-to-peer interaction made possible by cryptographic 
algorithms run across a distributed, geographically dispersed network of computers, this threatens 
and destabilises established forms of organisation and existing patterns in the distribution of power 
that it sustains. In responding to the kinds of interaction which these new technological capacities 
make possible, conventional legal systems will need to do at least two things.  First, they must 
evaluate whether activities taking place on blockchain networks should be regarded as matters that 
fall within the domain of the private.  This will invariably require them to identify whether, and to 
what extent, such activities may harm both network participants and the broader public, and to 
exercise political judgement concerning the kinds of activities and interaction which should properly 
be regarded as beyond the reach of the state106.  Secondly, if state intervention is deemed necessary 
and justified owing to the risk of harm associated with these networks, conventional legal systems 
must also find creative and practically effective ways for exerting their authority over activities upon 
and associated with blockchain networks.    
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The origins of Bitcoin, which established proof of the blockchain concept began an ideological project 
in the early 1990s by a group known as Cypherpunks.  Their political vision was, in essence, an 
anarchic one: they advocated an extreme form of libertarianism in which all forms of commerce 
                                                        
104  Further unauthorised hacks have occurred in relation to other ICOs since The DAO exploit including the 
Coindash hack in July 2017(see https://www.coindesk.com/coindash-ico-hacker-nets-additional-ether-theft-
tops-10-million/). 
 
105  Paech supra n.45. 
 
106  Where this line is drawn in relation to shifting cultural expectations of the public-private divide 
provoked by new digital technological is ultimately a matter of political culture.  See Perri 6 (1998) The Future of 
Privacy.  London: Demos. 
 
  25 
existed beyond state control, enabled by advances in cryptographic software that could provide users 
with complete anonymity107 made possible via a decentralized currency, which Bitcoin was intended to 
fulfil.108  This political vision assumed that reliance on cryptographic algorithms to enable 
trustworthy peer-to-peer interaction between strangers, and the distributed nature of the underlying 
computing network, would render conventional law unnecessary and unable to reach into the 
activities taking place upon or arising out of the network’s operation.  This paper has subjected these 
assumptions to critical scrutiny, arguing that the belief that blockchain systems will operate outside 
of, and independently from, conventional law, rests on two assumptions: firstly, that the conventional 
state legal system is rendered redundant because the blockchain provides an alternative governance 
framework, including guarantees of security, of equal or greater effectiveness and efficiency than those 
currently provided by conventional law, and secondly, that the state will not intervene in these 
networks, because it either has no significant legitimate interests that are threatened by particular 
blockchain networks or applications, or, even if the state has legitimate interests that it might 
plausibly seek to protect, it nevertheless lacks the practical capacity to take effective remedial action to 
forestall or mitigate these threats.     
 
I have argued that it is highly implausible to expect that these assumptions will be borne out in 
practice, owing to two critical roles currently undertaken by contemporary constitutional democratic 
states vis-à-vis their citizens: firstly, in safeguarding the rule of law and ensuring the universality of 
its protection and secondly, ensuring the basic security of its citizens.  Because blockchain systems 
may threaten the universality of the rule of law, and because the security offered by blockchain 
systems takes a rather limited form, in the guise of ‘transactional security’ which falls short of the 
nature and extent of security guarantees that citizens in contemporary democratic states have come to 
expect, I have argued that conventional national law-makers and enforcement officials have attempted 
to (and are likely to continue to) assert national sovereign authority over activities taking place upon, 
or arising out of, the operation of blockchain code, in certain circumstances.109  The critical question is 
not, therefore, whether states will attempt to exert legal authority over blockchain systems and 
interactions, but identifying the conditions in which they are likely to do so, and their success in 
employing strategies and techniques through which this legal authority can be successfully asserted in 
practice, given that the distributed nature of the network means that there is no central point of 
control upon which legal officials can target their enforcement efforts.   This paper has offered my 
hypothesis concerning how conventional national legal systems are likely to respond to blockchain 
systems (drawing on their emerging responses to date), in order to provide a schematic map of the 
kind of interactions that are likely to arise between these two quite different regulatory modalities.  
 
I have identified three different kinds of interaction between the code of law, and code as law, based on 
the intended motives and purposes of network participants when engaging in transactions upon the 
network, each giving rise to a distinctive form of interaction where blockchain is used for the purposes 
of: 
 
(a) hostile evasion, to evade the substantive constraints of conventional law.  National law enforcement 
authorities have asserted the superior authority of national law over blockchain-related activities of 
this kind, resulting in a dynamic of cat and mouse battle for supremacy; 
 
                                                        
107  Cunningham, Alan (2016) ‘Decentralisation, Distrust & Fear of the Body - the Worrying Rise of Crypto-
Law’ Script-ed 13: 235-57.  
 
108  Yet the motives of contemporary Bitcoin users may bear no relationship to its ideological origins, with 
studies identifying a range of user-motivations, ranging from strong political commitments, a desire for 
anonymity through to an intent to engage in illegal activities:  Yelowitz, Aaron and Matthew Wilson (2015) 
Characteristics of Bitcoin Users: An Analysis of Google Search Data. Applied Economics Letters 22: 1030-36. 
 
109  I share the Blackett review’s belief that the interests of nation states in exerting authority over 
blockchain systems will prove impossible to resist so that nation states will at least attempt to extend the reach 
of their sovereign authority in the form of conventional law to the transactions and interactions taking place: 
The Blackett Review 2016, Chapter 3, supra n 6. 
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(b) efficient alignment, with conventional law, by seeking to streamline or otherwise enhance 
compliance with legal standards.  No battle for supremacy between the law vs code arises because 
network participants willingly accept and voluntarily submit themselves to the jurisdiction of 
conventional law.  Yet because informal tensions are likely to arise between these two forms of 
ordering, I describe the resulting dynamic as the joys of (patriarchal) marriage – sometimes harmonious, 
at other times rather tense and fractious, but ultimately rooted in a shared commitment to deriving 
the benefits of long term mutual support and cooperation and in which the supremacy of conventional 
law is expressly acknowledged;  
 
(c) supporting novel forms of peer-to-peer co-ordination and cooperation to reduce transactional friction 
associated with the legal process, including the transaction, monitoring and agency costs associated 
with conventional law.  Here I suggest that the resulting dynamic between the two codes can be 
characterised as one of uneasy co-existence.   Whether national law enforcement authorities will attempt 
to assert their authority over activities undertaken on a particular blockchain network will depend 
upon whether those activities are considered likely to cause significant harm to third parties and/or 
those transacting on the network.  But unless and until an explicit attempt is made by conventional 
legal systems to reach into blockchain-based activities, the resulting uneasy coexistence between the 
code as law and the code of law may be characterised as one of mutual suspicion and uncertainty.   
 
My analysis has highlighted the underlying normative challenges and tensions that can be expected to 
shape the interactions between the two ordering systems, which are most acute in the third class of 
case, and ultimately grounded in the shifting and uncertain boundaries between the public and private 
realm in a continuously networked digital age.   As blockchain technologies mature and new 
applications emerge, both kinds of code will be faced with at least three points of tension, and which 
are likely to influence their on-going interactions and the extent to which they are predominantly 
antagonistic or co-operative in character.  First, blockchain developers committed to a vision in which 
the blockchain code can be relied upon exclusively to govern network interactions, are bound to be 
disappointed.  As legal scholars have long observed in their analysis of rules in the form of linguistic 
text as guides for future behaviour, rules are inevitably and inescapably imperfect110.  No amount of 
careful and detailed drafting is able to predict future events, and hence unanticipated situations will 
arise which existing rules are unable comfortably to accommodate111.  At the same time, the way in 
which rules have been drafted, whether in linguistic or computational form, will at times fail to reflect 
the intentions and expectations of their drafters.  In these situations, how the rules ought to apply will 
be a matter of interpretive debate and require human judgement, as The DAO Hack vividly 
illustrates.  If network participants are unhappy with the way in which such disputes are resolved 
within the blockchain community, then they may well turn to conventional law to remedy the 
perceived injustice.   
 
Secondly, even if blockchain networks can live up to their promise of enabling new forms of more 
democratic, peer-to-peer interaction than is currently possible through reliance on traditional modes 
of social organisation, they cannot in practice operate as hermetically sealed systems detached from 
the broader community beyond the network and the wider social world.  There will inevitably be 
differences in the size and significance of these external effects on the broader community, but it will 
fall to conventional legal systems to ensure that the legitimate rights, interests and expectations of 
the wider community are duly protected, in accordance with the terms of the implied social contract 
between the state and its citizens.  National legal systems will then be required to identify, evaluate 
and trade-off the balance of legitimate interests of those within the network with those operating 
outside the network, and this may require them to exert sovereign power over the putative ‘private’ 
arrangements of network participants.  In other words, even if blockchain systems can successfully 
provide reliable and efficient transactional security, they are unlikely to deliver other critical security 
guarantees (including protection against interference with rights of property, threats to health and 
safety, and unfair exploitation), that are currently (albeit imperfectly) provided by conventional law.    
 
                                                        
110  Black, Julia. Rules and Regulators.  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
 
111  Hart, H L A. The Concept of Law.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, 124-130. 
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Thirdly, network developers, participants and users will learn, whether through experiences such as 
The DAO Hack or otherwise, that software code is an imperfect and limited instrument of 
governance.  Not only is code prone to software bugs, but because rules themselves are imperfect 
guides for future action, requiring revision and updating as the economic, social and political context 
changes along with the needs of its users.  Accordingly, national legal systems will be required to 
identify the extent to which they are willing and able to respond to these deficiencies in order to 
protect network users and those outside the network, which necessitates reliance on human 
judgement.   In addition, blockchain’s decentralized structure presents additional operational risks.  
As Angela Walch has observed, the decentralised nature of public blockchains means that no one is 
responsible for keeping the Blockchain software operational, so that even if a crucial repair is needed 
to prevent complete collapse of the software, no one could be required to perform the repair. Even 
core developers who have been voluntarily working to maintain the blockchain could decide not to 
help in a moment of crisis, perhaps deeming their continued to involvement to be personally risky.   
And without any formally defined power, authority or accountability structure, although anyone with 
a suggested resolution to a crisis may propose a solution, it may take too long to achieve buy in from 
other members of the blockchain community to successfully implement the solution, either in an 
emergency or otherwise.112  As the Blackett Review reminds us, even unpermissioned blockchains do 
not exist independently of human rule-making and governed only by mathematical algorithms.   
 
Just like legal code, technical code needs to be produced and maintained by humans who define the 
rules that the code embodies….Like any software, Bitcoin needs to be regularly updated to address 
bugs, security issues, and changes in the operating environment.  Such an update can in principle 
change any aspect of the software, including accounting and ownership rules.  Who gets to write the 
software and how that process is governed is therefore critically important to all participants in a 
DLS.113 
 
These observations also highlight the lack of any existing laws mandating minimum internal 
governance requirements that public-facing blockchain networks must satisfy, so that users remain 
largely at the mercy of the network’s founders and developers in devising the basic framework for 
internal governance of the network and for implementing them via technical code.  My guess is that, 
in time, minimum standard to ensure that basic principles of good blockchain governance will emerge, 
although they might not take the form of mandatory legal standards.  In short, the success of 
blockchain will depend on effective and legitimate governance structures, which will require both the 
code that controls the operation of digital technologies (code as law) as well as the conventional rules 
provided by national legal systems (code of law).  In other words, the challenge is to find sustainable, 
stable yet flexible equilibrium in which legal and technical code can avoid engaging in an unhelpful 
battle for supremacy but enables them to coexist and collaborate in order to sustain valuable forms of 
social, economic and political interaction without posing unacceptable risks of harm to network 
participants or the wider community. 
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